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Book Reviews
By
Percival E. Jackson.t Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1969. Pp. xii, 583. $14.95.
DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT-A CHRONOLOGY.

The preface of Mr. Jackson's book rather grandly proclaims that
its purpose is "to enlarge the area of understanding of the Court and
its work, to increase the potential of public opinion that may influence
the Court's attitude and strengthen its support" by mirroring "the
acts and actions of its members, their strength and weaknesses, restraints and excesses, philosophies and idiosyncrasies."' Unfortunately,
this goal is not achieved, for Mr. Jackson has authored a dull work
consisting chiefly of a catalogue by subject matter of Supreme Court
dissents interspersed with lengthy quotations and the author's criticisms of many of the more controversial decisions of the Warren
2
Court.
That I cannot give the book a more favorable reception is indeed
unfortunate, for its theme is timely. With the recent change of Chief
Justices, the Warren Court is now history. Probably at no other time
(except perhaps during the early 1930's) has the Supreme Court received more public attention. And the focus of that attention has
frequently been the fact that the Court's decisions are often far from
unanimous. The change in Chief Justices generates additional interest in the Court and offers a natural point for pause and evaluation
of the Court's dissenters.
Having chosen subject matter with both wide appeal and currency,
the author begins with a useful chapter entitled "The Anatomy of
Dissent," in which he touches briefly upon the commonly given justifications for dissenting opinions--difficult legal questions which produce divergent views, appeals to future justices to right a wrong rule,
varying perceptions of the underlying facts, etc. Although hardly a
definitive work on dissenting opinions, the chapter does serve to give
the reader reference points by which to measure the dissents that follow. From here the author moves to a largely historical section. A
chapter is devoted to Justice William Johnson, the Marshall Court's
t
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chief dissenter, followed by one covering the relatively placid reign
of Chief Justice Taney. The dissents during The Civil War and Reconstruction period are given cursory treatment. The author then
develops the Court's early treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment
and moves from there to three chapters covering in detail the expansion of judicial power during the pre-New Deal period of substantive
due process. The sharp disagreement over New Deal legislation and
the aftermath of President Roosevelt's attempt to enlarge the Court's
size form the basis for three chapters tracing dissent in the 1930's.
The last several chapters of the first section introduce the second section by following the transition from Chief Justice Stone to Chief
Justice Vinson and concluding with two chapters titled "The Years of
the Witch-Hunt." An historical survey of this nature tends to become
pedantic. The tedium is somewhat relieved by the device of relating
the issues faced by early Courts to those of today, graphically demonstrating the essential continuity of the Court's business.
The last half of the book is devoted to the dissents of the Warren
Court. As one would expect, the author has isolated the major areas
of disagreement and covers the Fourth Amendment, civil rights, criminal cases (chiefly those dealing with confessions and the right to counsel), obscenity, reapportionment and voting, the First Amendment,
labor and anti-trust. Included in this section are a series of tables correlating dissents for the 1950 to 1967 Terms. These tables document
what has now become widely known-that the Supreme Court has
become increasingly contentious in recent years as it split into distinct
"liberal" and "conservative" factions. Finally, the author concludes
with a brief chapter suggesting that the Warren Court has gone astray
in legislating rather than confining itself to the proper judicial function of deciding cases.
As should be evident from the preceding summary, to undertake in
one volume a description of dissent in the Supreme Court is a major task.
And the job is made more difficult when it is undertaken with the
belief that lengthy quotation is desirable so that the Court's dissenters
may speak for themselves. Unfortunately, the very scope of this
attempt produces superficial treatment of the phenomenon of
dissent and contributes little to the reader's understanding of why
Supreme Court justices dissent or what role dissent plays in the judicial process. Mr. Jackson does emphasize the obvious-that though
the Supreme Court has always had its dissenters, both the volume
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and virulence of dissent have increased markedly during the last decade.3 But dissent serves purposes beyond the mere verbalization of
judicial disagreement over the resolution of complex political and
social issues. It acts as a check upon ill-considered views of the majority and tends to confine the Court to the issues at hand. Dissenters
provide assurance to the public and the litigants that the Court fully
deliberated the issues, considered contrary views, and attempted to
respond to divergent opinion. Often, the dissenter will dramatize the
need for legislation to resolve a problem exceeding judicial capabilities. 4 Equally important, dissent may well be a reflection of a highly
personal reaction to legal problems when the particular facts before
the Court find a resonance in the background and experience of an
individual justice. 5 Notably absent from the book is material giving
the reader insight into the forces which shaped the views of the dissenters. Given Mr. Jackson's professed desire to enlighten the general
public about Supreme Court dissenters, a fuller exposition of the
reasons for and the motives prompting dissent would have advanced
this goal.
Furthermore, the reader-especially the lay reader-will be left
with a simplistic view of the judicial process. Typical of Mr. Jackson's
approach is the introductory paragraph of his final chapter: "That
the Warren Court consisted of a libertarian majority is open to little
question. That, under the guise of interpreting the Constitution, the
Court has been legislating and declaring policy for years, is and has
been an accepted fact." 6 This comment seems to adopt the view often
expressed by those critical of the trend of recent decisions that the
Warren Court has somehow perverted the judicial process and distorted the traditional judicial role. Although the process and the role
are not clearly defined, and although the reader is never told how the
Court has gone astray, the distinct impression is that recent decisions
were arrived at by impermissible techniques. However, whether the
Court adheres to its prior decisions or establishes a new rule, every
constitutional question involves the weighing of competing values.
3. That the Warren Court has had more than its share of judicial conflict has long
been recognized. See, e.g., K. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1959); A. Sutherland, Supreme
Court Opinions: A Catalogue of Dissents, 45 A.B.A.J. 1178 (1959).
4. See S. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 923 (1962), cf R. Leflar,
Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 810 (1961).
5. For an excellent discussion of this subject, see J. Grossman, Social Backgrounds
and JudicialDecision-Making, 79 H.Av. L. Rrv. 1551 (1966).
6.
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There is no objectivity in constitutional law because there are no
absolutes. Justices legislate in any realistic sense any time they choose
between two positions. In the final analysis, each Justice determines
which set of values for his society he holds strongly enough to enforce
when the opportunity arises. Justices have been deciding cases by this
process since the Court was organized and will continue to do so.7 To
suggest that the Warren Court is doing something different is to mislead the reader.
The work has its redeeming features. If nothing else, it demonstrates
that dissent in the Supreme Court is not a recent phenomenon. This
alone may serve to convince the layman that the Court has always
been the focus for many of the acute issues of each era and that this
very fact will inevitably produce disagreement among men of different
backgrounds and beliefs. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has had
dissenters-Holmes, Brandeis, Douglas, Black-whose views anticipated the solutions of later judicial generations.' The work, by giving
each of these Justices ample treatment, illustrates the continuity from
dissent to future majority opinion. Finally, the Court's most articulate
spokesmen have often been its dissenters. Their dissents can be masterpieces of legal advocacy, persuasive, masterfully crafted, occasionally
humorous or sarcastic and always literary gems. Through the vehicle
of extensive quotations, this book exposes the reader to sheer good
reading.
Reduced to its essentials, I have but one basic complaint with the
work. In attempting to cover too much, the book's treatment of Supreme Court dissent is superficial. A less ambitious undertaking would
have afforded the opportunity for in-depth treatment. By biting off
more than the reader can conveniently chew, Mr. Jackson has unfortunately produced a somewhat indigestible book.
Samuel J. Roberts*
7.
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By PhilippeNonet.t New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1969. Pp. 274. $

ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE.

Professor Nonet has studied the evolution of the California Industrial Accident Commission from both a procedural and substantive
standpoint. As compared to the usual administrative law studies, the
author has blended the substantive problems with the legal procedures
to present a case study of industrial development and change. To the
typical lawyer who does not always examine the philosophic implications of the law that he helps to create, Professor Nonet's book provides
a sociological challenge to the adjudicatory procedures used in the
administration of welfare legislation.
The California Industrial Accident Commission, similar to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Board, was created in 1910 to mitigate the harsh doctrines of the common law which treated industrial
accidents arising from employment in the same manner as a case of
tort liability for negligence. In Pennsylvania, prior to Workmen's
Compensation, the employee was required to go through lengthy and
expensive court procedures, and he was barred from recovery unless
negligence could be directly attributed to the employer. Even then
the rules of "contributory negligence" and the "fellow servant" doctrine substantially reduced the likelihood of a successful court action.
The Pennsylvania Constitution was amended in 1915 to permit legislation to require the payment of compensation by the employer to
injured workmen, and Pennsylvania law further regards the right to
compensation as a contract between employer and employee. However, it is interesting to note that in both California and Pennsylvania
the early workmen's compensation laws were regarded as welfare measures, and even as late as 1960 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania referred to workmen's compensation as a humanitarian measure.'
In establishing the sociological climate in California in the early
days of the California Commission, Professor Nonet has uncovered
numerous early documents which characterize the problems of industrial compensation as an "attack on poverty."
Thus, because the California Industrial Accident Commission was
regarded as a welfare agency, compensation payments were not a matter of "right", but the goal was made to administer the Program for
t Professor of Sociology, University of California Center for the Study of Law and
Society.
1. Dupree v. Barney, 193 Pa. Super, 331, 163 A.2d 901 (1960).
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the rehabilitationof each given employee with the cessation of payments at the point of rehabilitation.
Under this paternalistic concept, legal procedures were shunned in
favor of administrative discretion and flexibility to enable consideration of the needs of the injured worker, the needs of the family, and
the kind of supervision and support necessary to return the worker to
employment. In fact, as described by Professor Nonet, the pre-World
War I goals and procedures of the California Industrial Accident Commission followed the pattern which subsequently emerged in the Public Assistance legislation of the Thirties.
In California, however, as in Pennsylvania, litigation instituted by
employers for review of compensation decisions very quickly established legal guidelines limiting the earlier concept of administrative
discretion. The informality of the roundtable developed into the witness box, the hearing room and the legal transcript. For administrative flexibility to survive, both parties must accept the discretionary
power of the administrative authority. Once the arsenal of legal defenses were brought into the hearing room by the employer, the discretionary and flexible procedures became subject to judicial scrutiny.
Professor Nonet provides a study in depth of the transformation and
evolution of the Agency to a quasi-judicial body wherein the role of
the Commission shifts from the "advocate" to the "adjudicator." In
other words, the social aspect of the Agency's function became secondary to its judicial role.
Professor Philip Selznick, chairman of the Center for Law and Society, in his introduction to this book describes this change in function
as "the sociology of the cop-out." The author points out in his final
chapters that as the "rule of law" has emerged, the reform measures
of the early period were modified and adjusted to "the system"
and under the process of "settlements" and fixed damages for injury,
"individual" justice has merged into "average" justice.
This book is important for a number of reasons. On the substantive
level of the evolution of the principle of the employer's responsibility
to the employee for injuries received in the course of employment,
numerous social problems still require resolution. The current "black
lung" controversy from the West Virginia coal mines illustrates that
we have not yet solved the problem of responsibility for industrial injury to the individual worker.
As a study in the evolution of an administrative agency it may be
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instructive to compare the evolution of the Industrial Accident Commission to current problems in the areas of Public Assistance and welfare payments. It is interesting to note that, as welfare recipients have
organized under anti-poverty programs, demands have been made to
remove the concept of "welfare" or "charity" from these stipends and
to establish in their stead certain basic "rights" on the part of the individual. From a reading of the history of the California Industrial
Accident Commission, as set forth by Professor Nonet, the question
arises whether the evolution of our concepts of workmen's compensation from "welfare" to "rights" does not also establish a pattern to
support similar changes in other types of welfare legislation.
The major defect in Professor Nonet's study-and perhaps this is
attributable to the fact that he is a sociologist and not a lawyer-is the
partial failure to recognize the social value of "legal rights" as opposed
to discretionary welfare. In fact, it would appear more appropriate to
conceptualize compensation as a "right" similar to old age and survivor's insurance rather than a welfare measure based upon considerations of need.
Procedurally, discretionary justice to meet the needs of the individual has been subject to serious scrutiny within the decade of the 60's.
Proponents of limited legal guidelines and discretionary power for
administrators in such areas as juvenile courts and similar quasi-judicial
institutions are now questioning the impact of such discretionary power
on the individuals who appear before these agencies. One advantage
of clear legal procedural guidelines is the protection of the individual against the vagaries of changing administrative officers. While the
Rule of Law may be restrictive, it can also serve as a bulwark against
abuse of power.
The history of the California Industrial Accident Commission also
sheds additional light on other aspects of regulatory agencies. In Chapter IV the author notes that from the inception of the compensation
law the injured employee and the employer did not operate on an
equal basis, and that the legal establishment of the employer groups
sought to strictly limit the benefits of the original statute. It was only
when the employee also had access to the trade union establishment
that equalization of forces occurred in these proceedings.
Unfortunately, many administrative agencies in the United States
have become partial captives of the industry which they were set up
to regulate. For example, the individual consumer is in no position

477

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 8: 475, 1970

to utilize the state forums which provide for the regulation of public
utilities. Many administrative agencies, originally established to simplify legal procedures, have acquired their own body of expertise, precedents and decisions.
Perhaps we have reached a point in the development of administrative agencies and administrative procedures where what is needed is
a public defender or ombudsman to represent the individual claimant.
The implementation of individual benefits is not so much a question
of discretionary justice but the need for the individual claimant to
have an advocate in the court.
In summary, Professor Nonet's book presents stimulating and provoking ideas. Even though sociologists and lawyers may not agree,
there is value to the legal profession to view legal problems from the
vantage point of another discipline.
Marion K. Finkelhor*

MOMENT OF MADNESS: THE PEOPLE VS. JACK RUBY. By

Elmer Gertz.t Chicago: Follett Publishing Co., 1968. Pp.
564. $6.95.
Elmer Gertz's book is an account of the suffering of Jack Ruby. The
book focuses on the post-trial and appellate stages of the case and on
the efforts Gertz and others made at the appellate level to dissipate the
heavy prejudicial atmosphere that hovered over the Ruby case at the
trial level.
Gertz was brought into the case after Jack Ruby had been sentenced
to death and Melvin Belli had departed. The author-defense counsel
outlines the workings of the American system of justice as it grappled
with Ruby, the problems created for the defense by publicity, and the
efforts of the defense to utilize the expertise of professionals outside
the field of law.
Gertz begins with a look backward to what happened to Jack Ruby
before Gertz appeared. His position in time allows him to dissect the
period of the trial objectively as he lays the groundwork for his discussion of his own involvement.
* Assistant Solicitor, City of Pittsburgh; Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
t
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The author tells us much about the separate proposed trial strategies
of Tom Howard, local criminal lawyer, and Melvin Belli. Gertz believes that each man's personality played an important role in determining the outcome at the trial level. Tom Howard is the hero of the
book. He was familiar with the case before Belli appeared and was
"a man like Ruby", except that Howard was "a small success," and
Ruby had always been "a big failure". Howard had been successful
in defending his "lower class" clientele, none of whom had ever reached
the electric chair. Gertz maintains that it was this success that led Howard to believe that he could save Ruby. His plan, as stated by the author in Chapter One, was simple.
In brief, he planned to secure a short sentence for Ruby by pleading that this highly emotional, overwrought little fellow had shot
Oswald, the sneak assassin of the beloved President, on impulse.
Of course, shooting Oswald was an evil act, but it would be equally
evil to punish Ruby excessively.'
Apparently, however, Tom Howard and his ideas were too simple.
Jack Ruby's family wanted "legal eminence."
There has been much criticism of Melvin Belli's conduct in the
Ruby case, but Gertz does not condemn him. Belli's plan was brilliant.
During his time as defense counsel he posed almost every question
relevant to the defense. The unprecedented nature of the Ruby case,
the intense publicity, and Belli's efforts to make a local Texas jury
accept the contributions of specialists outside the law made his role
difficult. And though the trial verdict was death and Belli had lost, it
was Belli and his plan that were instrumental in bringing the ultimate
reversal of the death verdict.
Much of the voiced criticism of Belli's conduct could have been directed at the Dallas District Attorney's office and Texas law. One
gathers from the book that the D.A.'s office was too loud. In Chapter
Two, the author says, "District Attorney Henry Wade, who should have
known better, was quoted as saying he would ask for the death penalty
with full confidence that a Dallas County jury would return the correct verdict in the case." 2 The relentless Bill Alexander described
Ruby's action as "the shooting of a manacled man down in cold blood,
and this is a death penalty case." 3 Gertz reveals well the confusion of
1.

E. GERTz, MOMENT OF MADNESS: THE PEOPLE VS. JACK RUBY 3 (1968).

2.
3.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 26.
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all the people involved. Pre-trial statements from the District Attorney's office, the indictment against "Jack Rubenstein alias Jack Ruby"
(for purposes of creating prejudice), massive publicity, and Judge
Brown's inability to understand his own actions all contributed to the
confusion.
Moment of Madness offers to the student and the practitioner a basic
case study of how the judiciary machinery affects human lives. It is
Elmer Gertz's active concern for such knowledge that aids in preserving the inherent right of the individual to a fair and just trial.
Elmer Gertz has succeeded in assuming the difficult position of lawyer-author. It was his purpose to research and cover material that was
little known. He has written an objective account of the later moments
of the Jack Ruby case: Moment of Madness.
Henry B. Rothblatt*
Member of the Bars of the States of New York and California.
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